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1. Introduction
Italy is often singled out as a country characterized by
widespread clientelism, bribery, nepotism, and themany
other terms that are conventionally used to denote ex-
changes involving inappropriate public-private transac-
tions and entailing negative consequences for demo-
cratic life, economic performance and civil coexistence—
corrupt exchanges in the broadest sense. Not all such ex-
changes are equally dangerous for a country’s economy
and democracy, yet all have some spillover effects that
may lead to graver forms of corruption. It is therefore im-
portant to disentangle ‘political corruption’ from other
types of ‘particularism’ with which it is often lumped,
thus blurring the real contours of the phenomenon, so
as to suggest ways in which it could be reined in by using
the tools of electoral democracy itself.
An extensive literature has explored the main struc-
tural, historical, and cultural factors purporting to ex-
plain Italian exceptionalism, but the persistence of Italian
corruption despite the country’s undeniable economic
and democratic progress since unification and then af-
ter WWII still proves an interesting puzzle (Uslaner &
Rothstein, 2016). The more recent literature has rather
highlighted the importance of contemporaneous institu-
tional developments.
This literature broadly subscribes to a rational in-
stitutionalist approach according to which politicians
aim to maximize officeholding, votes, and policy out-
comes, pretty much in that order (Budge & Laver, 1986).
Prioritization of officeholding and long-term incumbency
is the hallmark of ‘personalism’ (Cain, Ferejohn, &
Fiorina, 1987). Later a set of indicators and some fairly so-
phisticatedmodels to explain the degree of particularism
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in any given political system were developed (Carey &
Shugart, 1995; Seddon-Wallack, Gaviria, Panizza, & Stein,
2003), but did not succeed in sufficiently distinguishing
between different forms of particularism. It is our con-
tention that not all forms of particularism are equally
prejudicial to democracy, and that some may indeed be
a necessary step toward defeating corruption.
In this article, we concentrate on the Italian case, an
OECD country that, despite having reached remarkable
levels of development and wealth, still appears to be be-
set by widespread corruption. We chose the Italian case
also for methodological reasons, as Italy went through
three major electoral reforms in a relatively short period
of time (1993–2018). We believe that the Italian case al-
lows us to analyze whether the electoral system may ex-
pand or shrink the room for particularism, and whether
such particularism is pursued through programmatic ap-
peals, pork-barrel politics, and constituency service, or
through corrupt exchanges (concession of permits, pro-
curement contracts and other types of preferential treat-
ments in exchange for money).
The devastating effect that the unveiling of
widespread corruption by the ‘Clean Hands’ investiga-
tions had on the postwar Italian party system (Della
Porta, 1992; Della Porta & Vannucci, 1995, 1999) would
naturally lead to expect that the electoral reforms would
have as their main goal the removal of incentives for cor-
rupt deals. The reforms that followed, however, were
aimed at other objectives (broadly considered ancillary
to the fight against corruption but not directly related to
it) such as securing alternation in government, simplify-
ing the party system, and making government formation
more closely dependent upon electoral results. In this
article we investigate the indirect impact that those elec-
toral reforms had on corruption control.
Although the literature is far from having reached
a consensus, we start from the assumption that single
member plurality (SMP) systems are more conducive to
constituency service and pork-barrel politics than closed-
list proportional representation (CLPR) and that open-list
proportional representation (OLPR) is more conducive
to rent-seeking and corruption. These are very different
types of particularism that may lead to suboptimal allo-
cation of resources, but that differ in terms of their im-
pact on the legitimacy of the system and the citizens’ as-
sessment of democracy. We observe that the period in
which a high proportion ofMembers of Parliament (MPs)
were elected in single member districts within a mixed-
member (MM) system coincided with the period during
which corruption control was taken more seriously and
the perception of corruption abated. However, the re-
turn to CLPR systems (once again, dictated by other goals
than that of fighting corruption) dampened that effect
and ushered in a reversal of the trend in the perception
of corruption control.
We propose a very preliminary ‘test’ of this propo-
sitions by comparing Italy to four other political sys-
tems characterized by electoral systems that lie on a
sort of particularism gradient from SMP (UK) to MM
proportional (Germany) to majority (France) to propor-
tional representation (PR)—albeit with significant checks
tempering its proportionality—(Spain) system. What
emerges from this comparison is still a sort of Italian ex-
ceptionalism because levels of perceived corruption are
constantly higher and, contrary to what happens in the
other political systems, left-wing governments are per-
ceived to be more serious about corruption control than
right-wing governments.
The article develops as follows. In the next section,
we take stock of the literature on personalism and il-
lustrate the incentives for the supply of particularistic
politics. Section 3 elaborates on the various forms of
particularism and, drawing from the existing literature,
establishes criteria according to which different elec-
toral systems can be expected to create larger or nar-
rower margins for the different types of particularism.
Section 4 presents the background on our case study,
while Section 5 discusses various measurement options
of the dependent and independent variables and offers
a (preliminary and suggestive) test of our argument by
means of proxy indicators for clientelism, patronage, and
corruption. Section 6 concludes the article.
2. The Determinants of Particularism
The literature on particularism has its roots in the ana-
lysis of “the personal vote” (Cain et al., 1987). The per-
sonal vote is the share of the total vote which is obtained
thanks to the personal appeal of the candidate, because
of his/her past legislative record and/or programmatic
commitments. By cultivating a personal vote, legislators
aim at being elected and re-elected, thus increasing the
chances of their continuing incumbency. The contrast
that this concept seeks to establish is between the mo-
tivations that voters have for electing candidates based
on their personal appeal (personal reputation) and those
based on party appeals (party reputation).
There is no implication, in Cain’s et al. (1987) thesis,
that the party vote should bemore objective and rational
than the personal vote. In both cases, the motivations of
the vote can be entirely objective and rational, whether
reputational or programmatic. The personal vote can be
operationalized and measured by such indicators as the
politicians’ personal roll-call vote record on specific pol-
icy options, by the time and effort they devote to ‘con-
stituency service,’ and by how much public money they
manage to bring to their communities. The original in-
tuition behind the notion of personal vote gave rise to
the systematic analysis of the institutional conditions
that stimulate seeking the personal vote through what
was labelled “particularism” (Carey & Shugart, 1995;
Seddon-Wallack et al., 2003). Several aspects of the elec-
toral systems contributed to the supply of particular-
ism, jointly suggesting that SMP, OLPR, and CLPR systems
ranked at decreasing levels of particularism (cf. Cheibub
& Nalepa, 2020, pp. 4–6).
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Candidates running in SMP systems would need to
pitch their promises and programs to local constituents,
regardless of whether they happened to run in safe or
contested districts. Under such a system, a broad appeal
can be crafted by offering sectional benefits, i.e., benefits
that accrue to the prevailing local interests regardless of
whether other districts might be more needy or deserv-
ing. This electoral system, then, induces MPs to contra-
vene the democratic expectation that legislative output
should cater to the broad interests of the entire society,
and as such is decried as particularistic.
PR systems in general should exert the opposite ef-
fect. Because the number of seats each party garners is
determined ‘by and large’ by the electoral result across
the entire national territory, the expectation is that cross-
sectional special interests will tend to be favored wher-
ever they happen to be located and legislative output will
indeed be universalistic. At the level of electoral district,
however, the incentives for single candidates change de-
pending on whether the system is closed- or open-list.
In CLPR, candidates will want to run on the party plat-
form since the more votes the party gets, the more can-
didates will be elected starting from those placed higher
up on the list. In OLPR, candidates will have an interest in
differentiating their electoral appeal as preference votes
may secure election for popular candidates placed lower
down on the list. In OLPR the incentives to cast a distinc-
tive profile, to cater to locally prevalent categorical inter-
ests, or to get the vote by distributing selective benefits
to clienteles are strong, so that universalistic public goods
will be forsaken in favor of localized public goods, at best,
or of private benefits to few, at worst (a more detailed
discussion of this literature is presented in Section 3).
The literature that emanated from these seminal
works focused on the incentives that electoral systems
create for legislators to seek reelection through particu-
laristic appeals, thus concentrates on the supply of par-
ticularism. Legislators must find the resources to pitch
their personalistic pledges (Gingerich, 2009). As these
will probably not come entirely from the party’s coffers,
because to some extent particularistic politics set indi-
vidual candidates against party leaders, the quest for
the personal vote may induce candidates and particu-
larly incumbents to look for extra resources by asking for
campaign contributions in exchange for public contracts
(‘kickbacks’), favorable legislation (‘grease’) or by infil-
trating the public administration with trusted support-
ers and, through these, providing jobs and other selec-
tive benefits to voters (patronage). If state funds are di-
rectly ‘skimmed’ and end up ‘lining individual candidates’
pockets,’ this is corruption at its ugliest. In this perspec-
tive, higher levels of particularism are associated with
higher levels of (potential) corruption. This general con-
clusion, however, must be supplemented with a more
fine-grained analysis of which type of particularistic ex-
changes each system promotes.
Voters are assumed to limit themselves to choosing
between different types of particularistic bids, be they
programmatic, selective at the level of constituency or
sectional group (constituency service/pork-barrel poli-
tics), or selective at the level of individual voters (clien-
telism). They are generally assumed to prefer the provi-
sion of public goods according to universalistic criteria,
but difficulties in monitoring the behavior of legislators
and mounting collective actions in order to dislodge cor-
rupt politicians make them rather passive receivers of
the legislators’ bids. The emphasis of the literature on
particularism, therefore, relies heavily on an analysis of
the ‘supply side.’
The literature on corruption, on the other hand,
tends to focus on the ‘demand side,’ to the extent that
it highlights the monitoring and sanctioning activity of
the voters. The starting point is the same—how differ-
ent electoral systems create incentives for particularistic
or corrupt exchanges—but the emphasis is then shifted
from the incentives and opportunities for legislators to
offer this or that type of particularistic appeal to the vot-
ers’ (and competing candidates’) interest and capacity
to expose and sanction corrupt bids. In this literature,
too, voters are assumed to prefer the provision of pub-
lic goods according to universalistic criteria, but they are
additionally assumed to actively sanction corrupt bids
through their voting choices. In this they are helped
by competing candidates interested in dislodging incum-
bent legislators by exposing their corrupt behavior.
For several reasons, we find this approach insuffi-
cient. Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell (2013) argue that,
in thoroughly corrupt systems, efforts to fight corrup-
tion must be based on a collective action model that
emphasizes the incentives that ‘legislators’ have in re-
fraining from corrupt dealings rather than on a principal-
agent model that relies on the willingness of ‘voters and
competitors’ to monitor and sanction corrupt behaviors.
Without ascribing Italy to the universe of thoroughly cor-
rupt systems, we still think that even in Italy individually
rational voters and competitors will be willing to settle
for suboptimal but nevertheless selectively rewarding in-
centives andwill adjust their behavior to themainstream,
respectively. In other words, we believe that corruption
ultimately can be curbed only through a second-order
commitment on the part of legislators who collectively
decide to change the systemic incentives in order to dis-
courage corrupt particularistic exchanges for all.
We therefore shift the emphasis back on the legisla-
tors who are objectively better placed to overcome col-
lective action problems and carry out such reforms, and
we concentrate on Italy’s electoral systems as incentiviz-
ing different types of particularistic exchanges.
3. Electoral Systems and Incentives for Different Types
of Particularistic Exchanges
The universe of electoral systems is conventionally di-
vided into PR, SMP, and MM systems (Farrell, 2011), but
they are often regrouped by the literature according to
corruption-relevant features, in particular the relative
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bargaining power that they lend party leaders vis-à-vis
individual candidates (the supply side) and the incen-
tives that they create for voters and competing candi-
dates to monitor and sanction corrupt behaviors (the
demand side). Scholars disagree as to whether SMP or
PR systems (and within this universe, OLPR or CLPR sys-
tems) grant more power to candidates or party leaders
and whether they create stronger or weaker incentives
for monitoring and sanctioning corruption on the part of
voters and competing candidates. The conventional wis-
dom after Carey and Shugart (1995) and Seddon-Wallack
et al. (2003) is that SMP, OLPR, and CLPR stand in a de-
creasing order of particularism. A debate immediately
followed concentrating on the different types of partic-
ularistic bids that these systems incentivized and, there-
fore, on the consequences in terms of the production of
public goods and the control of corruption.
Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi (2003), focusing on the
demand side, argue that SMP systems aremore prone to
corruption than PR systems because the latter are asso-
ciated with larger electoral districts, more intense com-
petition, and greater opportunities for monitoring and
sanctioning but do not distinguish between the types of
particularism incentivized. Golden and Chang (2001) and
Pellegata and Memoli (2018) show that in PR systems
larger electoral districts make monitoring more difficult,
enfeeble accountability and ultimately favor corruption.
Ceron and Mainenti (2018) argue that voters are more
inclined to forgive corruption charges if they can select
the candidates. As this influence may be exerted either
through preference voting in OLPR systems or inMM sys-
tems, they produce further evidence to support the com-
mon claim that OLPR systems are more prone to corrup-
tion than CLPR.
District magnitude, a variable that had been found
by Carey and Shugart (1995) to exert opposite effects in
CLPR and OLPR systems, became the object of a heated
debate that introduced other dimensions of electoral
competition and prompted a reconsideration of the over-
all effects of electoral systems on both the supply and the
demand of particularism. For example, André, Depauw,
andMartin (2015) argued that the candidates’ perceived
‘vulnerability’ is capable of offsetting the disincentive to
pay attention to constituents generated by CLPR and of
reinforcing the incentive generated by OLPR. They con-
clude, in linewith Carey and Shugart (1995), that “district
magnitude has a differential effect dependent on the bal-
lot structure”: It decreases constituency effort in CLPR
systems and increases it in OLPR systems since in this sys-
tem candidates are generally speaking more vulnerable
(Carey & Shugart, 1995, p. 486). With reference to Italy,
Chang and Golden (2007) concurred.
The recent literature, however, questions the expec-
tation that OLPR systems would be more prone to cor-
rupt exchanges than CLPR systems. Kselman (2020) ar-
gues that OLPR systems are associated with higher ef-
forts at producing public goods at the district level (what
we would call constituency service) than CLPR:
In the current paper, public goods are produced at
the level of multimember proportional representa-
tion (PR) districts rather than the entire electorate.
The ‘scope’ of public goods thus occupies an inter-
mediate position between highly particularistic ‘pork-
barrel’ policies in single-member district systems, and
universalistic policies, which benefit the entire elec-
torate equally. (p. 114)
He thus confirms the stronger effect of OLPR systems on
the supply of a kind of constituency-centered particular-
ism that we too differentiate from corruption proper, but
which can nonetheless activate corrupt exchanges in an
effort to draw resources to the district.
Other recent studies contest the conventional rank-
ing of CLPR and OLPR along a gradient of increasing
likelihood to generate corrupt exchanges by introducing
other variables such as party leadership countervailing
strategies in the compilation of the closed lists (Cheibub
& Sin, 2020), their use of preferential voting as sort of
primaries for subsequent election rounds (Folke & Rikne,
2020), and their importing in the party platform the
messages of the candidates that fared best in previous
elections under OLPR systems (Carroll & Nalepa, 2020).
These counterstrategies can be subsumed under the ob-
servation that party leaders learn from past elections
and act strategically to counter personalistic tendencies
(Mershon, 2020).
Other studies focus on both supply and demand
sides. Kuniková and Rose-Ackerman (2005) discuss both
aspects and argue that the relative autonomy of candi-
dates vis-à-vis party leaders shifts the locus of corrup-
tion towards the former in SMP systems (and conversely
shifts it to party leaders in PR systems), even though the
greater ease with which the behavior of individual candi-
dates can be monitored in SMP systems may moderate
the effect. Interestingly, they distinguish between “cor-
ruption that personally enriches politicians” and “the use
of campaign funds by politicians to purchase votes on
an individual basis” (Kuniková & Rose-Ackerman, 2005,
p. 576). They discuss how accepting kickbacks from a
company that promises to build a factory in the con-
stituency should be considered, and observe that it will
depend on “the distortions introduced by corruption in
pork-barrel projects” (Kuniková&Rose-Ackerman, 2005),
but also underscore that the same features that encour-
age narrow geographic targeting also contain features
that tend to dampen corrupt rent-seeking behavior by
politicians. We agree that the word ‘corruption’ should
be used to denote only individual rent-seeking and fur-
thermore strongly agree that redirecting corruption from
pure rent-seeking to pork-barrel politics or constituency
service may be the first step on the path towards eman-
cipation from corruption.
This brief reference to the literature that studies
the effect of electoral rules on corruption shows how
numerous the institutional variables and how complex
their impact on corruption can be, and that the same
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variable (e.g., district magnitude, candidate vulnerabil-
ity) can have opposite effects in different electoral sys-
tems. Together, these studies strengthen our resolve
to focus on the supply-side of particularism and con-
firm our initial expectation that OLPR systems tend
to make parties captive to particularistic drives and
therefore precede both CLPR and SMP in the gradi-
ent of increasingly corrupt particularistic exchanges. The
ranking based on a simple measurement of particular-
ism (SMP > OLPR > CLPR) gets reversed when we fo-
cus on the kind of exchanges that get incentivized by
these systems: In our case, properly corrupt exchanges
(OLPR > CLPR > SMP).
4. Particularism in Italy during the First and Second
Republic
In this article we concentrate on Italy and focus the ana-
lysis on the supply side of corruption. We are aware
that incentives for corruption may depend on aspects
of the electoral-institutional system that were designed
with different objectives in mind. In Italy, concern over
corruption, mainly attributed to the illegal extraction of
public resources by political parties, competing party fac-
tions, and individual candidates, was second in impor-
tance only to themore general concern for the instability
of governments and the lack of accountability of the po-
litical system (Mershon, 2002).
4.1. The First Republic
The First Republic (1946–1994) is the period investigated
in particular byMiriamGolden in hermany studies, alone
and with colleagues. Golden and her colleagues con-
structed and experimented with a number of measures
of corruption, using both the number of parliamentary
authorizations for court cases to be brought against MPs
indicted for wrongdoing (Golden & Chang, 2001) and
the difference between the earmarked funds for public
works and the cumulated value of the works effectively
brought to completion (Golden & Picci, 2005, 2008) to
pin down the dependent variable. Her findings mainly
concern the pivotal party of Christian Democracy (DC),
which was in power without interruption between 1948
and 1994 but can be extended to the other governmen-
tal parties as well, particularly from the mid-1970s on-
ward. First, political corruption was significantly associ-
ated with intra-party competition and, in the early post-
war period, substantially unaffected by inter-party com-
petition (Golden & Chang, 2001, pp. 592, 594). Second,
the 1974 law on public financing of parties, which “di-
rected funds to party organizations…and left individual
candidates on their own to raise the necessary cam-
paign funds” (Golden & Chang, 2001, p. 596), paradox-
ically created additional incentives to engage in corrupt
exchanges. Third, henceforth corruption “contaminated”
the smaller coalition partners as well, since they had to
be taken into consideration in the division of kickbacks
and spoils in order to keep the lid on the actual system
of campaign financing (Golden & Chang, 2001, p. 605).
Fourth, interparty competition had a limited impact on
corruption until the Italian Communist Party (PCI) won
an impressive electoral result at the 1976 national elec-
tions (Golden & Chang, 2001, p. 611) and shook the ex-
isting system, but also created the premises for a “conso-
ciational” division of the spoils.
The rather somber conclusion to which Golden and
Chang arrive is that in 1994 the Italian political system
was on a path of growing corruption, since politicians
not prepared to use such tactics were crowded out by
the competition (Golden & Chang, 2001, p. 613). A sim-
ilar rational-institutionalist approach characterizes the
analysis of political patronage in Italy—the distribution
of positions in the public administration to friends and
followers—and leads to the conclusion that redundant
and contradictory legislation was purposely made by
Italian politicians so as to be able to then act as “facili-
tators” with the public administration on behalf of their
voters (Di Mascio, 2012; Golden, 2003; Golden & Picci,
2008). Yet, as emerges from Golden and Picci (2015),
despite such intense vying for visibility and personaliza-
tion on the part of candidates, there appeared to be
no incumbency premium in pursuing the personal vote
through corrupt means. This result is somewhat counter-
intuitive, and points to party leaderships that, until 1992,
managed to control the selection of candidates despite
the effort of candidates to curry the personal vote, but it
is broadly in line with the evidence discussed by Carroll
and Nalepa (2020), Cheibub and Sin (2020), and Folke
and Rikne (2020).
Impressive as they are, Golden’s findings suffer from
two shortcomings. First, her analysis stops at 1994, after
which almost everything changed in Italy, from the indi-
vidual parties to the electoral system, from the rules on
party financing to the ease with which MPs could be in-
vestigated and indicted. Second, she does not differen-
tiate among different types of particularism but rather
considers all particularistic exchanges as ‘corrupt.’ We,
on the contrary, believe that different types of partic-
ularism should be assessed differently. In an effort to
find ways to fight corruption, it makes a lot of differ-
ence whether the personal vote is cultivated by articulat-
ing a distinctive programmatic platform, funneling cen-
tral moneys to the local constituency as a whole through
public projects of general utility, or favoring certain local
special interests over others. It also makes a lot of differ-
encewhether particularism takes the form of fairly harm-
less constituency service, as in the UK (also see Piattoni,
2007, on different types of Southern Italian clientelism),
entrenched pork-barrel politics, or flagrant defiance of
laws and regulations.
The present article seeks to make a contribution to
this literature by extending the above argumentative
line to the post-1994 period, during which Italy exper-
imented with three new electoral systems, and by try-
ing to distinguish between different types of particular-
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ism induced by electoral reforms ostensibly aiming at
other goals.
4.2. The Second Republic
Although suspicions that the system had become thor-
oughly corrupt circulated at least since the end of the
1980s, the pervasiveness of corruption that was unveiled
was astounding. Not even relatively new parties (such as
the Lega Nord) or parties which had made a battle cry
out of the “moral question” (the PCI) were found to be
immune from corruption. The end of the 1980s marked
a veritable historical watershed, as the dénouement of
the Cold War brought to an end not only the division of
the world in two blocs but also the flow of party financ-
ing from the US (to the DC and the other bourgeois and
liberal parties) and the USSR (mostly to the PCI, and origi-
nally also the Italian Socialist Party [PSI]).Meanwhile, the
electorate had become more fluid and willing to vote for
new parties. New issues—regional autonomy, the adop-
tion of the euro, and a nagging sense of slipping behind
the rest of ‘Europe’—mobilized voters in new ways. This
‘perfect storm’ further weakened the postwar parties’
grip on the electorate and put wind in the sails of a class
of magistrates eager to clean up the rotten postwar sys-
tem. Outraged citizens stopped voting for the traditional
parties and turned their support to new ones such as the
Lega Nord (an alliance of political movements located
mainly in the north of the country seeking to detach
themselves from an allegedly vexatious political center)
and the Forza Italia party of Silvio Berlusconi. In the 1992
elections the historical postwar parties were weakened
and in 1994 they were effectively wiped out.
An impressive series of reforms, some spearheaded
by the political elite, other bargained between elites and
masses (Renwick, 2011), and some even prompted by ju-
dicial activism (Massetti & Farinelli, 2019), have been im-
plemented particularly since the early 1990s. The early
postwar reforms had aimed at stabilizing the party sys-
tem and allowing ample expression of the many con-
flicting orientations that characterized an extremely po-
larized electorate. In the circumstances, PR had been
the obvious choice but its open-list variant activated
clientelistic relations which in turn ignited corrupt ex-
changes. The need for an electoral system that would
guarantee voters’ choice while incentivizing a healthier
form of particularism—in practice the adoption of a SMP
system—was at the center of the 1987 referendum ini-
tiative spearheaded by the Radical Party (Baldini, 2011,
p. 650). The referendum failed, but the need for a system
that would minimize the space for corrupt exchanges re-
mained: “PR had turned from being a cornerstone of the
political system to the main target of the reformers’ ac-
tions” (Baldini, 2011, p. 650). The 1991 referendum or-
ganized by DC reformist leader Mario Segni, which reg-
istered an impressive participation rate and an unprece-
dented consensus (95,6%), succeeded in eliminatingmul-
tiple preferential voting, universally identified as the in-
stitutional device for corrupt exchanges. The other ob-
jective (reforming the OLPR system into a majority, two-
round SMD system similar to the French one), however,
failed. Since the late 1980s, most observers concurred
that governmental instability and lack of accountability
were the gravest evils of the Italian political system, and
that corruption was a side-product of that system.
The overarching concern now was to lend execu-
tives greater durability, making government formation
more immediately dependent on electoral results, and
securing alternation in government. An intermediate ob-
jective, seen as instrumental for achieving both main
goals, was to reduce the number of parties and/or in-
centivize the formation of pre-electoral “political poles”
that would compete as if they were single parties. These
goals suggested the adoption of a MM (but mainly SMP)
electoral system that would hopefully ease the transition
from the fragmented and fractious postwar party sys-
tem to a simpler and more orderly one. For a long time,
the objective was to arrive at a SMD majority system
(Bartolini, D’Alimonte, & Chiaramonte, 2002). The pres-
sures that had built up since the late 1980s eventually led
to a reform of the “mass-elite interaction” type which,
in mature economies, should lead to greater personaliza-
tion of the vote (Renwick, 2011, p. 463). The Mattarella
laws (n. 276 and 277, 4.8.1994) succeeded in changing
the electoral system precisely in this direction. The ensu-
ing system was a mixed member system that allocated
75% of parliamentary seats through a SMD system and
25% through a closed-list PR system.
As Baldini (2011, p. 654) affirms, “The 1993 reform
was the result of different, and sometimes conflicting,
pressures that weak and increasingly delegitimized par-
ties could not ignore.” There were two aims to this re-
form: On the one hand, the incentives for the cultiva-
tion of a corrupt personal vote were to be minimized
and those for a healthier form of constituency service
maximized; on the other, the system was meant to in-
duce parties to announce their programmatic alliances
before elections, in view of building stable governmen-
tal coalitions that could last the entire legislature. It had
been recognized that one of the problems of the postwar
Italian political system had been the extreme fickleness
of governmental coalitions, which often collapsed simply
because some intra-party faction or powerful member
had become dissatisfied with the current allocation of
governmental and patronage positions. Fewer, stronger
parties organizing themselves into two opposed political
blocs would yieldmore stable governments andmore co-
herent fiscal and monetary policies. Unfortunately, the
reform achieved the former goal but failed to achieve
the latter, which in turn prompted further reforms aimed
at simplifying the party system and making competing
alliances more credible and durable (the details are in
Regalia, 2018, pp. 85–91).
On the basis of the classifications of electoral sys-
tems operated by Carey and Shugart (1995) and the ordi-
nal measures of the same proposed by Seddon-Wallack
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et al. (2003), it is theoretically possible to calculate the
room for particularism offered by each electoral system.
An attempt in this direction was made by Piattoni and
Mainenti (2007) after the Mattarella electoral reform,
and further conjectures were formulated by Piattoni
(2018) with regard to the two following reforms in 2005
and 2017. However, solid quantitative tests have not
been carried out for want of reliable measurements of
the dependent variable and for the difficulty of consid-
ering all the institutional and procedural details that af-
fect the type of inter- and intra-party competition that
these electoral reforms have triggered. So, while it is pos-
sible to hypothesize that the Mattarella law of 1993 in-
creased the incentives for constituency service and re-
duced those for clientelist or corrupt forms of particular-
ism, this cannot easily be proven. While the allocation
of most parliamentary seats by SMP (and the concomi-
tant liquidation of a large part of the old political class)
opened up many seats to candidates from new parties
and to distinguished personalities previously uninvolved
in politics, in subsequent elections parties found ways of
‘reproportionalizing’ some of these seats, thus claiming
control over their allocation (D’Alimonte & Chiaramonte,
2010). This electoral law yielded a bipolar political sys-
tem, one of the objectives of the reform, but also ex-
tremely fragmented center-right and center–left coali-
tions, which remained hostage to the blackmail of even
the smallest of their constituent parties (Regalia, 2018).
Given the continued instability of governmental coali-
tions even within a bipolar system, in 2005 the elec-
toral law changed once again, and the system was sub-
stantially reproportionalized. The Calderoli law (n. 270,
21.12.2005) replaced the Mattarella mixed electoral sys-
temwith a CLPR system and introduced amajority bonus
for the party or coalition that obtained the largest num-
ber of votes in the lower or upper chamber. The new sys-
tem was essentially proportional, but introduced some
correctives—long closed lists in order to help keep party
discipline, various types of thresholds for seat allocation
for parties running together or running separately, thus
favoring pre-electoral coalitions, the possibility for pop-
ular party leaders to run in several districts and later
choose which seat to represent, thus gaining the relin-
quished seat(s) for the following candidate on their list—
aimed at helping the formation and duration of govern-
ments and of limiting the personal vote and favoring
party discipline. The Constitutional Court subsequently
declared the Calderoli law unconstitutional, citing the ex-
cessive length of the lists and size of the majority bonus,
which prompted a further reform of the electoral law.
Three elections were held under the Calderoli sys-
tem (2006, 2008, and 2013) which however yielded dif-
ferent results as a consequence of the changing strate-
gies of party leaders. D’Alimonte and Chiaramonte (2010)
specifically discuss the different strategies pursued dur-
ing the 2006 and 2008 elections. During the first, the
main left and right coalition parties tried to mop up all
possible votes from all smaller parties which could be
attracted to their side and thus put together very frag-
mented and fractious large coalitions which quickly dis-
solved under the pressure of excessive intra-coalitional
requests. During the second election, both leading par-
ties managed to form much tighter coalitions, thus de-
creasing the blackmail potential of the smaller parties,
which for the most part could hope to win only a hand-
ful of seats. Inter- and intra-party competition in the two
election rounds, therefore, differed not because the elec-
toral system had changed, but because the party strate-
gies had. These differences are hard to model, and it
would consequently be difficult to formulate hypothe-
ses on the incentives that this electoral system produced
in terms of particularistic exchanges. For this reason, in
what follows, we limit ourselves to testing the general
trend of corruption control under the two electoral sys-
tems, Mattarella and Calderoli, between 1996 and 2016.
The third reform, known as the Rosato law, is too re-
cent and has so far been used only in the 2018 elections
(law n. 165, 3.11.2017).
5. Evidence
Measuring corruption is hard, and the difficulties in cap-
turing the phenomenon with quantitative data are well-
known to the scholarly literature, as discussed above.
The problems inherent in the measurement of any crimi-
nal/sanctionable activity, especially those committed by
social and political elites, are compounded by debates
on the nature and scope of the concept, as well as by
cultural differences across countries and time periods.
Various strategies of operationalization have been fol-
lowed by scholars in the field, with varying degrees of
success. Most large-N studies covering significant time
spans in a multi-country framework have adopted a rep-
utational approach, enquiring after the perception of cor-
ruption in a given country at a given time. The public
whose views form the basis of the indicator may vary,
from political science experts to ordinary citizens to mar-
ket participants, domestic or foreign. Despite the signif-
icant drawbacks of this strategy, the chief among which
being cultural bias and path-dependency, it remains the
soundest and most parsimonious for comparative pur-
poses, and as such has been adopted herein.
In order to shed light on the Italian case, we have
made recourse to three composite measurements of
corruption, produced by three entities: theWorld Bank’s
Worldwide Governance Indicator Control of Corruption
(WB; World Bank, 2018), Democracy Barometer’s
Absence of Corruption (DB; Merkel et al., 2018), and
International IDEA’s Global State of Democracy Absence
of Corruption (ID; International IDEA, 2019). Each of
these indexes, in turn, is an aggregate of various dif-
ferent sub-measurements, with distinctive provenances
and nuances. Although the definitions vary somewhat,
as do the scales (−2.5 to 2.5 for WB, 0 to 100 for DB,
0 to 1 for ID), we consider them as broadly comparable
measurements of the perceived level of corruption, with
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a higher score corresponding in all cases to a more ‘virtu-
ous’ situation. All three datasets’ historical series begin
in the 1990s. The consequent limitations of the data, in
order to ensure comparability, oblige us to curtail the
scope of our analysis to the two decades 1996–2016:
Hence, we are able to measure the (perceived) level of
corruption in Italy during the 13th through (part of) the
17th legislature, the first two of which (1996–2006) were
selected with the mainly-majoritarian Mattarella elec-
toral law, and the rest with the mainly-PR Calderoli law.
When we consider the data from these indicators,
the first macro finding is a trend: The perception of how
corrupt Italy is deteriorated significantly from the late
1990s to 2016, across indicators (Figures 1 and 2). As our
explanatory variable is ordinal (the shift fromanelectoral
system hypothesized to induce less pathological partic-
ularism to one believed to foster more), the appropri-
ate statistical treatment is an analysis of variance, with
dummy variables introduced to represent the different
electoral systems; furthermore, as the choice is binary
(Mattarella electoral law vs. Calderoli electoral law), the
analysis simplifies to a one-tailed t-test of the difference
in means between the value of the corruption indica-
tor in 1996–2005 and in 2006–2016. The difference has
the correct sign, and the test is statistically significant
well below the 0.01 level for both the WB and DB in-
dicators (see replication materials), hence consistently
with our hypothesis about the incentives of the two elec-
toral regimes.
Given the large number of plausible confounders,
and the small N of the country–year observations for our
indicators, the strategy pursued for checking the robust-
ness of our results relied on the multi-country nature
of all the data-collection projects from which our indica-
torswere drawn. Specifically, this fact allowed us to place
Italian corruption perception in context by comparing it
with other European cases. Data for four representative
Western European countries from these same databases
are presented: Spain, France, Germany, and the UK are
often employed comparatively, as they have somewhat
similar population and GDP size, as well as being (at the
time) fellow EUmembers, but their political cultures and
institutions are distinctive. In particular, their electoral
systems fall on various points of the ‘continuum of par-
ticularism’ described above (mainly PR systems for Spain
and Germany,moremajoritarian ones for France and the
UK). Crucially, however, none of these democracies ex-
perimented with changes in their electoral laws in the
period 1996–2016.
When one considers either the four-country average
or the single paths, it is apparent that Italy is an outlier
with regard both to the rate of decline in corruption con-
trol over the period and to the very low starting level. If
the lattermaybe imputed to secular factors related to po-
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
0.40
–0.10
0.90
1.40
1.90
World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators: Control of Corrupon
FR ES D UK EU4 Average IT
Figure 1.WB indicator.
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Figure 2. DB indicator.
litical culture and societal trust, the former remains puz-
zling. What can be concluded is that electoral systems
do not dictate absolute levels of corruption perception
across countries per se but changing electoral systems
may set in motion certain reputational changes.
The third indicator we consider presents a some-
what different story. The variation over the period is
much more nuanced (Figure 3), and the difference in
means between the two periods falls within the mar-
gin of error. A potential explanation for this different
finding is that the ID indicator is significantly weighted
toward expert scholarly opinion rather than policymak-
ers/market participants. The disaggregated distribution
of sub-indicators (Figure 4) that make up the ID indi-
cator is instructive: The first four—respectively labeled
“Public sector corrupt exchanges,” “Public sector theft,”
“Executive embezzlement and theft,” “Executive bribery
and corrupt exchanges,” (Tufis, 2019, pp. 121–126)—are
all stationary or oscillate around a mean: An indication,
perhaps, of stable perceptions of governmental behav-
ior, or the personal reputation of leading politicians al-
ternating in power. It is interesting to note that Public
Sector Theft, which could be taken as a proxy for pa-
tronage, remains constant during the period of observa-
tion, indicating Italy’s long-term failure at building a bu-
reaucracy “entrenched behind a statute of bureaucratic
autonomy” (Shefter, 1994). On the contrary, the indica-
tors of “political” corruption display more variation and
appear to be more sensitive to changes in institutional
factors. The only indicator with a secular negative trend
is the fifth one (“Corruption”), which claims to capture
the perceptions of the business community whose sen-
timent turned negative again once the hope for a thor-
ough cleansing on the system were dashed in the early
2000s (see Tufis, 2019, p. 127). In any case, when com-
pared with the other big-four West European democra-
cies the fluctuations in the Italian indicator are more pro-
nounced (and the baseline lower), andwhen considering
only the fifth sub-indicator, no country displays the pat-
tern of long-term decline witnessed in Italy (Figure 5).
Speaking of fluctuations and reputation, it is reason-
able to consider whether there is any relationship be-
tween the country’s reputation for corruption and the
(partisan) identity of the occupants of executive office.
In reputational studies of corruption, it makes sense to
watch out for fixed effects, and the indicators adopted al-
low us to study these variations across countries. Table 1
summarizes the findings. The two decades 1996–2016
are divided into periods on the basis of the party holding
a parliamentary majority. Hence, different administra-
tions may be lumped together if their ideological orien-
tation did not change (e.g., the Chirac and Sarkozy presi-
dencies) or, vice versa, broken up (e.g., the Merkel chan-
cellorship in 2005–2009, 2009–2013, and thereafter).
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Table 1. Governments by parliamentary majority (1996–2016) in selected European countries.
Government (by party parliamentary majority) Length (years) Ideological slant ΔWB
UK—Major + 1 Right 0.065
UK—Blair, Brown 13 Left −0.445
UK—Cameron/LD 5 COAL 0.28
UK—Cameron 1 + Right 0.02
Germany—Kohl + 2 Right 0.14
Germany—Schroeder 7 Left −0.16
Germany—Merkel/SPD 4 COAL −0.13
Germany—Merkel 4 Right 0.05
Germany—Merkel/SPD 2 3 + COAL 0.03
E-Aznar 8 Right 0.23
E-Zapatero 7 Left −0.26
E-Rajoy 5 + Right −0.58
France—Chirac + 1 Right 0.07
France—Chirac/PS 5 COAL −0.09
France—Chirac 2, Sarkozy 10 Right 0.23
France—Hollande 4 + Left −0.06
Italy—Prodi, D’Alema, Amato 5 Left 0.23
Italy—Berlusconi 5 Right −0.16
Italy—Prodi 2 2 Left −0.21
Italy—Berlusconi 2 3 Right −0.09
I-Monti 2 COAL −0.13
I-Letta, Renzi 3 + Left 0.03
Notes: + indicates that the executive continued before or after the span of the dataset. ‘COAL’ indicates a government whose ideological
balance straddles the right–left divide, as traditionally instantiated in the specific country. ΔWB is change in WB corruption indicator
between the first and last year of the executive. For 1997, 1999, and 2001 values (not present in the WB database) the average of the
year immediately preceding and immediately following were used.
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The WB indicator is presented here (the others are dis-
played in the replication material).
One factor is immediately apparent: While many tra-
ditional explanations of corruption in Italy during the
First Republic focused on the lack of any real alternation
of political personnel in power, this cannot be the reason
for Italy’s continued struggles with corruption since the
1990s, for there was greater alternation in government
in Italy than in any other country in our sample.
A few other considerations are in order. The three
indicators do not yield a unanimous position as to the
relation between length of government and effects on
corruption. While WB data indicates a strong negative
correlation between length of government and perfor-
mance on corruption control, DB data presents a com-
parable positive correlation, and ID data a weaker ver-
sion of the same. TheWB and DB indicators concur, how-
ever, in picking up an ideological difference in the effect
on perceived corruption: In the four European countries
considered, right-wing governments tend to leave office
with their country perceived as less corrupt than when
they took office, while the opposite is true of left-wing
governments. Coalitions straddling the left-right divide
are seen as intermediate by WB, as vastly better than ei-
ther right or left by DB. In Italy, however, the result is
precisely the opposite: Both WB and DB spot a signifi-
cantly better performance for left-wing rather than right-
wing governments.
While this finding may be driven by idiosyncratic
facts, such as the international reputation of Silvio
Berlusconi (Fabbrini, 2013), it is possible to hypothe-
size an indirect effect through the electoral system, at
least inasmuch as left-wing governments were widely
expected to prove internationally responsible (hence
also in fighting corruption) but the change in the elec-
toral system in 2005 made it much more difficult for
them to retain power, by weakening the ties of respon-
sibility between popular electoral choice and govern-
ment composition.
6. Conclusions
In this article, following an institutionalist perspective,
we have argued for an effect of a shift in electoral
regimes on the overall supply of particularism, hence on
corruption levels as a whole. Moreover, we have tried to
highlight how different electoral systems incentivize dif-
ferent types of particularism and argued that some can
be used as intermediate steps on a path towards corrup-
tion control. These achievements are, however, depen-
dent on whether they activate other political dynamics
which then prompt reversed reforms.
Our empirical evidence can be interpreted as a first,
tentative step in the direction of corroborating our the-
oretical hypothesis, by showing how perceived corrup-
tion declined somewhat after the majoritarian reform of
1993 and soared again in Italy after the reproportional-
ization of 2005; corruption control indices show a similar
picture, with an improvement between 1996 and 2006
and a subsequent decline thereafter. Our preliminary
conclusion is that, although the 1993 reform had ignited
a positive trend towards healthier types of particularis-
tic exchanges that promised to wean Italy out of politi-
cal corruption, its side-effects in terms of increased frag-
mentation of the party system and increased instability
of governmental coalitions prompted “counter-reforms”
aimed at addressing these problems but which however
rekindled themore systemic aspects of corruption (state-
centered patronage; DiMascio, 2014).More specific indi-
cators suggest that amore comprehensive defense of our
thesismust be left to future research andwill have to rely
on alternative strategies of data collection on the depen-
dent variable, moving past the perception paradigm. We
also argued that different electoral systems incentivize
different types of particularism.
Our conjecture—that a SMP systemmight transform
systemic corruption, performed by both parties and in-
dividual legislators under the OLPR system of the First
Republic, into a ‘healthier’ system in which at least the
interests of local constituencies are addressed—was par-
tially borne out by our empirical analysis. We under-
stand that this would be but a modest improvement
and would not amount to the eradication of particular-
ism. We realistically think that all representative systems
encourage a mix of particularistic and universalistic ap-
peals that can however strike healthier or more patho-
logical balances. Our recommendation would therefore
be to revise once again the Italian electoral law in view
of creating a stronger linkage between individual candi-
dates and their electoral districtswithout however enfee-
bling party discipline too much. We understand that this
would probably be the outcome of a long transition in
which institutional provisions would induce correspond-
ing cultural shifts.
Our evidence also highlighted two other interesting
and counterintuitive facts. The first is how much of an
outlier the Italian case is in comparative perspective,
both in terms of trend and of baseline: such a result
calls for renewed attention to the case in a spirit of
methodological pluralism, as it may well be that both
long-term political culture dynamics and shorter-term in-
centive variations are at play. The second surprising find-
ing has to do with the partisan reputations for corrup-
tion in Italy, compared to other European countries. How
such a finding extends to present conditions, following
the revolution in the political system wrought by the rise
of the Five-Star Movement and the re-branding of the
League as a populist radical-right party, may provide an
interesting puzzle for future research.
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